Abstract. Recently, Liu et al. [Commun. Theor. Phys. 57, 583, 2012] proposed a quantum private comparison protocol based on entanglement swapping of Bell states, which aims to securely compare the equality of two participants' information with the help of a semi-honest third party (TP). However, this study points out there is a fatal loophole in this protocol, i.e., TP can obtain all of the two participants secret inputs without being detected through making a specific Bell-basis measurement. To fix the problem, a simple solution, which uses one-time eavesdropper checking with decoy photons instead of twice eavesdropper checking with Bell states, is demonstrated. Compared with the original protocol, it also reduces the Bell states consumption and simplifies the steps in the protocol.
Introduction
Since Bennett and Brassard [1] proposed the first quantum key distribution protocol in 1984, various quantum cryptography protocols have been flourished by utilizing quantum mechanics principles, including quantum secret sharing (QSS) [2] [3] [4] , quantum key distribution (QKD) [5] [6] [7] , quantum teleportation [8, 9] and quantum direct communication (QDC) [10] [11] [12] [13] , etc. The main purpose is to provide unconditionally secure information exchange on basis of the law of quantum mechanics.
As a fundamental primitive in modern cryptography, secure multiparty computation (SMC) has been a research hotspot in classical cryptography. It originated in the millionaire problem introduced by Yao [14] , in which two millionaires hope to determine who is richer without revealing the precise amount of their fortunes. As a first step to solve the millionaire problem, private comparison of equality was proposed by Boudot et al. [15] to compare the equality of two millionaires' property, without disclosing any actual information. However, the security of SMC is based on the computational complexity assumptions, so it may be seriously threatened by the powerful quantum computer. Fortunately, quantum cryptography, which is regarded as one of the most promising applications of quantum mechanics, is able to guarantee the unconditional security of the information.
As the quantum counterpart of private comparison of equality, quantum private comparison of equality (QPCE) has become an important branch of quantum cryptography. QPCE allows two participants to privately compare the equality of their secret information based on the properties of quantum mechanics, without disclosing any information about their secrets. However, Lo [16] pointed out that the equality function cannot be securely evaluated by two-party protocol in quantum scenario. Therefore, an additional condition with a third party (TP) is necessary to reach the goal of private comparison. The pioneering QPCE protocol was proposed by Yang et al. [17] in 2009, in which a one-way hash function was used to calculate the hash values of two participants' secret inputs firstly, and then these hash values were encoded into the photons of EPR pairs. In essence, its security is guaranteed by the hash function. Since then, with different categories of quantum states, many other QPCE protocols have been proposed [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] . Recently, Liu et al. [25] proposed a QPCE protocol based on Bell states. In the protocol, the characteristic of quantum entanglement swapping is utilized to realize the comparison task, and TP is assumed as a semi-honest third party. However, while revisiting Liu et al.'s protocol, we find that it has a fatal security loophole, i.e., TP can obtain all of the two participants secret information without being detected through making a specific Bell-basis measurement (we called it as TP's measurement attack), which is obviously against the QPCE's requirements [26] . Furthermore, a simple and efficient solution is given herein to eliminate this security loophole.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, Liu et al.'s protocol is briefly reviewed. In Sect. 3, the security loophole is analyzed and an improved strategy is given. Finally, a short conclusion is given in Sect. 4.
Review of Liu et al.'s Protocol
In Ref. [25] , Liu et al. proposed a QPCE protocol based on Bell states |Φ
(|01 ) ± |10 ). In the protocol, all the three parties need to prepare Bell states, and the private comparison task is fulfilled by utilizing the entanglement swapping between the Bell states of the participants' and TP's. The main procedures of the protocol are as follows.
Prerequisite. Alice and Bob agree that the states |Φ + , |Φ − , |Ψ + , |Ψ − represent the information '00', '01', '10', '11', respectively.
Step 1. Alice (Bob) equally divides her (his) binary representation of secret inputs X (Y ) into ⌈L/2⌉ groups, and they are denoted by G
Step 2. Alice, Bob and TP prepare ⌈L/2⌉ Bell states in |Φ + , and take the first (second) particle from each state to form their own sequences S 
If there is no eavesdropper, Alice and TP discard the checking particles, and continue the next step.
Step 4. Alice performs the Bell-basis measurement on corresponding two particles in S 
is '00'('01', '10', '11'). As a result, the corresponding two particles in S C 1 , S A 2 on TP's hand will be collapsed into one of four Bell states (shown in Fig. 1b) . The new sequences are denoted by S
Step 5. Bob and TP prepare another order L ′ -length Bell states sequences in |Φ + , and insert them into S , respectively, which is same as that in Step 3. After that, Bob and TP exchange the second particles sequence (shown in Fig. 1c) , and perform the eavesdropper checking in the same way. If the quantum channels of Bob-TP and TP-Bob are secure, Bob and TP discard the checking particles, and continue the next step.
Step 6. Bob performs the Bell-basis measurement on the corresponding two particles in S 
Step 8. TP sends R to Alice and Bob, if R = 0, then X = Y ; otherwise X = Y . As shown above, the eavesdropper checking of Alice-TP and TP-Bob quantum channels are performed step by step, that means it needs to make twice eavesdropper checking to confirm the secure of the whole quantum channels from Alice to Bob. And in the protocol, TP is assumed to be semi-honest third party [27] , who is allowed to misbehave on its own but cannot conspire with either of two participants. So, TP can make any attacks in the communication process as long as he does not collude with the two participants. That is to say, TP is likely to launch the measurement attack to obtain the participants' secret inputs. The more details will be described in Sect. 3.
TP's Measurement Attack and the Improvement

TP's Measurement Attack on Liu et al.'s Protocol
While reexamining Liu et al.'s protocol, we find that there exists a security loophole in it. TP could launch the measurement attack to obtain all the two participants' secret inputs without being detected. The detailed analysis is as follows.
As depicted in Step 4, after Alice performs Bell-basis measurement on two particles in S A 1 , S C 2 , the corresponding two particles on TP's hand will be collapsed into one of four Bell states. Then the correspondence of particles after the entanglement swapping can be shown as below,
From the above Eq. 1, we can know that there is a direct relationship between Alice's and TP's Bell states, i.e., they are always the same. For example, if the outcome of Bell measurement on the pair on TP's hand (C 1 , A 2 ) is |Φ + , the Bell state on Alice's hand (A 1 , C 2 ) must be |Φ + . Then, TP can steal Alice's and Bob's secrets through the below approach.
Suppose TP wants to steal Alice's secrets. TP makes the Bell-basis measurement on the particles on his hand in Step 4, and gets the outcome M 
Step 7, that means, the encrypted messages E A j , E B j are required to be sent through the public channel. As we all known, the classical information transmitted through the public channel can be arbitrarily obtained without being detected. Therefore, TP can get E A j without being detected. In terms of E TP can also steal Bob's secrets. As depicted in Step 6, Bob and TP perform the Bellbasis measurement on the corresponding two particles on their hands, respectively, which will result in the entanglement swapping between TP and Bob. And the correspondence of particles can be one of the following four equations,
Since TP had made the Bell-basis measurement on particles C 1 and A 2 , and got the outcome M 
The Improvement
To fix the loophole, we use the decoy photons instead of Bell states for eavesdropper checking. What is more, we introduce one-time eavesdropper checking instead of original twice ones in the Alice-TP and TP-Bob channels. To be specific, Step 3 and 5 in the original protocol need to be revised as follows.
Step 3 TP analyzes the error rate. If the error rate is higher than the threshold they preset, he will abort the protocol; otherwise, the TP-Alice quantum channel is secure, and Alice discards the checking particles and continues the next step. It should be noted that sequence S [25] . Since our improvement is similar to Liu et al.'s protocol, so it can also resist these attacks.
Since we use the decoy photons to make one-time eavesdropper checking instead of the original twice eavesdropper checking with Bell states, the particle efficiency has also been improved. For ensuring the checking photons is enough for performing eavesdropper checking, we suppose the number of checking particles is the same as that of message-encoded particles, that is, the length of checking particles L ′ = ⌈L/2⌉, and the length of secret inputs is L = 2⌈L/2⌉. In QPCE, η = η s /η q is usually used to calculate the particle efficiency, here η s represents the number of classical bits of secret inputs, and η q denotes the total number of particles used in the protocol. In Liu et al.'s protocol, TP, Alice and Bob totally generate 6×⌈L/2⌉ particles (i.e., 3⌈L/2⌉ Bell states) to compare secret inputs (X and Y ), and 8⌈L/2⌉ particles (i.e., 4L ′ Bell states) to make eavesdroppers checking, so η s = L, η q = 3L+4L = 7L, and then η Liu = L/7L ≈ 14.29%. In our improved version, totally 6 × ⌈L/2⌉ message-encoded particles (i.e., 3⌈L/2⌉ Bell states) and 3⌈L/2⌉ checking decoy photons are utilized, so η Our = L/4.5L ≈ 20.22%. Obviously, our particle efficiency is high than that of Liu et al.'s protocol. One point should be noticed, that is the particle efficiencies we calculated here are different from Ref. [18, 28] , because they did not consider the photon consumption in the eavesdropper checking stage.
Discussion and Conclusion
The efficiency is one of the purposes and goals of our continuous improvement in quantum private computation. The eavesdropper checking is taken in every step of the particles' transmission in many QPCE protocols (including Liu et al.'s protocol), which makes these protocols anfractuous and inefficient. As we all know, the action of checking always requires the participant to have quantum devices, e.g., the qubit generating machine, the quantum memory, or the quantum measuring machine. Considering that these devices are expensive in the practical situation, it is unrealistic that every participant is equipped with all these quantum devices. Compared with this step-bystep checking, one-time checking may reduce the particles consumption and simplifies the protocol steps. On the other hand, since decoy photons are more economic and feasible in the practical application than other entangled states, Using decoy photons for eavesdropper checking may be a best choice.
In this paper, we find there is a security loophole in Liu et al.'s protocol, i.e., TP can launch the measurement attack to steal all the two participants' secret inputs. In order to fix the loophole, we utilize one-time eavesdropper checking with decoy photons instead of original twice eavesdropper checking with Bell states. And the improved protocol not only can resist TP's measurement attack, but also gets higher particle efficiency.
